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Abstract. In the present work, a peculiar property of hash-based signa-
tures allowing detection of their forgery event is explored. This property
relies on the fact that a successful forgery of a hash-based signature
most likely results in a collision with respect to the employed hash func-
tion, while the demonstration of this collision could serve as convincing
evidence of the forgery. Here we prove that with properly adjusted pa-
rameters Lamport and Winternitz one-time signatures schemes could
exhibit a forgery detection availability property. This property is of sig-
nificant importance in the framework of crypto-agility paradigm since the
considered forgery detection serves as an alarm that the employed cryp-
tographic hash function becomes insecure to use and the corresponding
scheme has to be replaced.
Keywords: hash-based signatures · Lamport signature ·Winternitz sig-
nature · crypto-agility.
1 Introduction and problem statement
Today, cryptography is an essential tool for protecting the information of various
kinds. A particular task that is important for modern society is to verify the
authenticity of messages and documents in an effective manner. For this purpose,
one can use so-called digital signatures. An elegant scheme for digital signatures
is to employ one-way functions, which are one of the most important concepts for
public-key cryptography. A crucial property of public-key cryptography based
on one-way functions is that it provides a computationally simple algorithm for
legitimate users (e.g. for key distribution or signing a document), whereas the
problem for malicious agents is extremely computationally expensive. It should
be noted that the very existence of one-way functions is still an open conjecture.
Thus, the security of corresponding public-key cryptography tools is based on
unproven assumptions about the computational facilities of malicious parties.
Assumptions on the security status of cryptographic tools may change with
time. For example, breaking the RSA cryptographic scheme is as at least as
hard as factoring large integers [1]. This task is believed to be extremely hard
for classical computers, but it appeared to be solved in polynomial time with the
use of a large-scale quantum computer using Shor’s algorithm [2]. A full-scale
quantum computer that is capable of launching Shor’s algorithm for realistic
RSA key sizes in a reasonable time is not yet created. At the same time, there
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
12
99
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 M
ay
 20
19
2 E.O. Kiktenko et al.
are no identified fundamental obstacles that prevent from developing quantum
computers of a required scale. Thus, prudent risk management requires defending
against the possibility that attacks with quantum computers will be successful.
A solution for the threat of creating quantum computers is the development
of a new type of cryptographic tools that strive to remain secure even under
the assumption that the malicious agent has a large-scale quantum computer.
This class of quantum-safe tools consists of two distinct methods [3]. The first
is to replace public-key cryptography by quantum key distribution, which is a
hardware solution based on transmitting information using individual quantum
objects. The main advantage of this approach is that the security relies not on
any computational assumptions, but on the laws of quantum physics [4]. How-
ever, quantum key distribution technologies today face a number of important
challenges such as secret key rate, distance, cost, and practical security [5].
Another way to guarantee the security of communications is to use so-called
post-quantum (also known as quantum-resistant) algorithms, which use specific
class of one-way functions that are believed to be hard to invert both using
classical and quantum computers [6]. The main criticism of post-quantum cryp-
tography is the fact that they are again based on computational assumptions so
that there is no strict proof that they are long-term secure.
In our work, we consider a scenario, where an adversary finds a way to vi-
olate basic mathematical assumptions underlying the security of a particular
cryptographic primitive. Thus, the adversary becomes able to perform successful
attacks on information processing systems, which employ the vulnerable cryp-
tographic primitive in their workflow. At the same time, it is in the interests of
the adversary that the particular cryptographic primitive to be in use as long
as possible since its replacement with some another one eliminates an obtained
advantage. Thus, the preferable strategy of an attacker is to hide the fact of the
breaking used cryptographic primitive. It can be realized by performing attacks
in such a way that their success could be explained by some other factors (e.g.
user negligence, hardware faults, and etc.), but the not the underlying cryp-
tographic primitive. An illustrative example of such a strategy is hiding the
information about the successes of the Enigma system cryptoanalysis during
World War II.
Broadly speaking, the question we address in the present work is as follows:
Is it possible to supply a new generation of post-quantum cryptographic algo-
rithms with some kind of alarm indicating that they are broken? We argue that
the answer on this question is partially positive, and the property, which we refer
as a forgery detection availability, is inherent for properly designed hash-based
signatures that are an important class of post-quantum digital signature algo-
rithms [6]. Intuitively, a forgery of a hash-based signature most likely results in
finding a collision with respect to the underlying cryptographic hash function
(see Fig. 1). The demonstration of this collision can serve as convincing evidence
of the forgery and corresponding vulnerability of the employed cryptographic
hash function. We refer the mathematical scheme for the evidence of the forgery
event as a proof-of-forgery concept. We would like to emphasize that some hash
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Fig. 1. Demonstration of the idea behind proving the fact of the hash-based signature
forgery. In order to forge the signature, an adversary finds a valid preimage for a
given image of a cryptographic hash function. If the size of the preimages space is
large enough then the preimage obtained adversary is most likely different from the
legitimate user’s one. Disclosing the colliding preimage could serve as evidence that
particular hash function is vulnerable.
functions have been compromised after their publication [7–9]. Thus, the con-
sidered problem is of practical importance, rather than just purely academic.
In the present work, we illustrate the forgery detection availability property
for Lamport [10, 11] and Winternitz [11] one-time signatures schemes. First, we
consider the Lamport scheme, which is paradigmatically important: It is the first
and the simplest algorithms among hash-based schemes. However, the Lamport
scheme is not widely used in practice. Then we analyze the Winternitz scheme,
particularly the variant presented in Ref. [12], which can be considered as a
generalization of the Lamport scheme that introduced a size-performance trade-
off. Variations of the Winternitz scheme are used as building blocks in a number
of modern hash-based signatures, such as LMS [13], XMSS [14], SPHINCS [17]
and its improved modifications [15, 16], as well as applications such as IOTA
distributed ledger [18].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give a short introduction to
the scope of hash-based signatures. In Sec. 3, we provide a general scheme of
detecting signature forgery event and define a property of the ε-forgery detection
availability (ε-FDA). In Sec. 4, we consider the ε-FDA property for the gener-
alized Lamport one-time signature (L-OTS). In Sec. 5, we consider the ε-FDA
property for the Winternitz one-time signature (W-OTS+). We summarize the
results of our work in Sec. 6.
2 Hash-based signatures
Hash-based digital signatures [6, 19] are one of the post-quantum alternatives
for currently deployed signature schemes, which has gained a significant deal
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of interest. The attractiveness of hash-based signatures mostly due to low re-
quirements to construct a secure scheme. Typically, a cryptographic random or
pseudorandom number generator is needed, and a function with some or all of
preimage, second-preimage, and collision resistance properties, perhaps, in their
multi-target variety [11,15,20]. Some schemes for hash-based signatures require
random oracle assumption [21] to precisely compute their bit security level [22].
Up to date known quantum attacks based on Grover’s algorithm [23] are
capable to find a preimage and a collision with time growing sub-exponentially
with a length of hash function output [24, 25]. Specifically, it is proven that in
the best-case scenario Grover’s algorithm gives a quadratic speed-up in a search
problem [23,24]. While this area is a subject of ongoing research and debates [26–
28], hash-based signatures are considered as resilient against quantum computer
attacks. Meanwhile, the overall performance of hash-based digital signatures
makes them suitable for the practical use, and several algorithms have been
proposed for standardization by NIST (SPHINCS+ [15], Gravity-SPHINCS [16])
and IETF (LMS [13], XMSS [14]).
We note that the hash-based digital signature scheme can be instantiated
with any suitable cryptographic hash function. In practice, standardized hash
functions, such as SHA, are used for this purpose since they are presumed to
satisfy all the necessary requirements. The availability of changing a core crypto-
graphic primitive without a change in the functionality of the whole information
security system fits a paradigm of crypto-agility, which is the basic principle of
modern security systems development with the built-in possibility of the com-
ponent replacement.
3 Proving the fact of a forgery
Here we present a general framework for the investigation of the proof-of-forgery
concept. We start our consideration by introducing a generic deterministic digital
signature scheme.
Definition 1 (Deterministic digital signature scheme) A deterministic dig-
ital signature scheme (DDSS) S = (Kg,Sign,Vf) is a triple of algorithms that
allows to perform the following tasks:
– S.Kg(1n) → (sk, pk) is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that outputs
a secret key sk, aimed at signing messages, and a public key pk, aimed at
checking signatures validity, on input of a security parameter 1n.
– S.Sign(sk,M) → σ is a deterministic algorithm that outputs a signature σ
under secret key sk for a message M .
– S.Vf(pk, σ,M) → v is a verification algorithm that outputs v = 1 if the
signature σ of the signed message M is correct under the public key pk, and
v = 0 otherwise.
We note that the deterministic property of the DDSS is defined by the fact
that for a given pair (sk,M) the algorithm S.Sign(sk,M) always generates the
same output.
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Signer S Adversary A Receiver R
Step 0 sk, pk pk pk
Step 1 sk, pk, (M,σ) pk, (M,σ) pk, [(M,σ)]
Step 2 sk, pk, (M,σ) pk, (M,σ), (M?, σ?) pk, [(M,σ)], (M?, σ?)
Step 3 sk, pk, (M,σ), (M?, σ?) pk, (M,σ), (M?, σ?) pk, [(M,σ)], (M?, σ?)
Step 4 sk, pk, (M,σ), (M?, σ?), E pk, (M,σ), (M?, σ?), [E] pk, [(M,σ)], (M?, σ?), E
Table 1. Message-signature pairs and keys available to involved parties on each step
of the scenario, where the adversary A makes a successful CMA obtaining a signature
σ for some message M , and forges a signature σ? for some new message M? 6= M
under the public key pk of the signer S. However, the signer S is able to construct the
corresponding proof-of-forgery message E in order to convince the receiver R that the
forgery event happened. Square brackets correspond to the optional message-signature
transmission.
The standard security requirement for digital signature schemes is their ex-
istential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EU-CMA). The chosen
message attack setting allows the adversary to choose a set of messages that a
legitimate user has to sign. Then the existential unforgeability property means
that the adversary should not be able to construct any valid message-signature
pair (M?, σ?), where the message M? is not previously signed by a legitimate
secret key holder. EU-CMA is usually proven under the assumption that the
adversary is not able to solve some classes of mathematical problems, such as
integer factorization, discrete logarithm problem, or inverting a cryptographic
hash function.
In the present work, we consider a case where this assumption is not fulfilled.
We also restrict ourself with considering one-time signatures only, therefore, a
legitimate user can sign only a single message with his secret key. The gen-
eralization for the many-time signature schemes can be obtained in a rather
straightforward way.
Let us discuss the following scenario involving three parties: An honest le-
gitimate signer S, an honest receiver R, and an adversary A. At the beginning
(step 0) we assume that S posses a pair (sk, pk) ← S.Kg, while R and A have
a public key pk of S, and they have no any information about corresponding
secret key sk (see Table 1).
At step 1 A forces S to sign a message M of A’s choice. In the result, A
obtains a valid message-signature pair (M,σ). At this step, R may or may not
know about the fact of signing M by S.
Then at step 2 A performs an existential forgery by producing a new
message-signature pair (M?, σ?) with M? 6= M . Below we introduce a formal
definition of the signature forgery and specify two different cases.
Definition 2 (Signature forgery and its types) A signature σ? is called a
forged signature of the message M? under the public key pk and the signature
scheme S if S.Vf(pk, σ?,M?)→ 1, where the message M? has not been signed by
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the legitimate sender possessing secret key sk corresponding to pk. The following
two cases are possible.
– A pair (M?, σ?) is called a forgery of type I if the signature σ? has been
previously generated by the legitimate user a signature for some message
other than M?. That is, there is a message M with S.Sign(sk,M) → σ?
previously signed by a legitimate user.
– A pair (M?, σ?) is called a forgery of type II if the signature σ? has not
been previously generated by the legitimate user. That is, there has not been
a message with signature σ?, signed by the legitimate user.
We note that there is also another scenario of attack, corresponding to the strong
unforgeability property [29], where A is interested in constructing a new valid
signature for a message that has been previously signed by the legitimate sender,
that is with M? = M and σ? 6= σ. However, the consideration of this kind of
forgery is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The type I forgery can take place if the signature algorithm S.Sign calculates
a digest of an input message, and then computes a signature of the corresponding
digest. In this case, the adversary A may find a collision of the digest function,
and then force the legitimate user to sign a first colliding message by using it as
M , and automatically obtain a valid signature for the second colliding message
(use it as M?).
An example of type II forgery is the reconstruction of the sk from pk using an
efficient algorithm (in analogy to the use of the Shor’s algorithm on a quantum
computer for the RSA scheme). We note that in our consideration it is assumed
that the only way for the adversary A to forge the signature for M? is to employ
advanced mathematical algorithms and/or unexpectedly powerful computational
resources. In other words, we do not consider any side channel attacks or other
forms of secret key “stealing”, such as social engineering and others.
Coming back to the considered scenario, at the step 2, A sends a pair
(M?, σ?) to R claiming that M? was originally signed by S. If the signature
is successfully forged by the adversary A, then this could be the end of the
story: The signature scheme is hijacked.
However, we suggest accomplishing this scenario by the following next steps.
At the step 3, R sends a message (M?, σ?) directly to S in order to request an
additional confirmation. Then S observes a valid signature σ? of the correspond-
ing message M?, which was not generated by him. The concrete issue we address
in the present work is whether S is able to prove the fact of a forgery event. Here
we formally introduce a proof-of-forgery concept, which is mathematical evidence
that someone cheats with signatures by employing computational resources or
advanced mathematical algorithms.
Definition 3 (Proof-of-forgery of type I) A set E = (pk, σ?,M,M?) is called
a proof-of-forgery of type I (PoF-I) for a DDSS S if for M 6= M? there is a valid
signature σ? for these two messages, i.e. the following relations hold:
S.Vf(pk, σ?,M?)→ 1, S.Vf(pk, σ?,M)→ 1. (1)
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Obviously, if the adversary A performs the type I forgery, then S is able to
prove this fact by demonstrating M to R at step 4. Thus, S and R have the
complete PoF-I set E = (pk, σ?,M,M?), and they are sure that someone has an
ability to find signature collisions, which is typically beyond the consideration in
standard computational hardness assumptions. Moreover, they can use the set
E to prove the fact of the forgery event to any third party since E contains a
public key pk. We also note that it is possible to prove the fact of a forgery of
type I for any DDSS. The situation in the PoF-II case is more complicated.
Definition 4 (Proof-of-forgery of type II) A set E = (pk, σ˜?, σ?,M?) is
called a proof-of-forgery of type II (PoF-II) for a DDSS S if for a message
M? there are distinct valid signatures σ˜? 6= σ?, i.e. the following relations hold:
S.Vf(pk, σ˜?,M?)→ 1, S.Vf(pk, σ?,M?)→ 1.
The ability of the adversary A to perform a forgery of type II depends on a
particular deterministic signature scheme S. Suppose that A has succeeded in
obtaining sk from pk (e.g. by using Shor’s algorithm and RSA-like scheme), then
it is impossible for S to convince R that (M?, σ?) was not generated by S. How-
ever, if the adversary A has succeeded in obtaining a valid, but different secret
key sk′ 6= sk, then the legitimate sender S is able to construct the corresponding
PoF-II set by calculating Sign(sk,M?)→ σ˜? with σ˜? 6= σ?.
As we show below this scenario is the case for properly designed hash-based
signatures. We consider particular examples of Lamport and Winternitz one-time
signatures schemes. We show that under favourable circumstances S’s signature
σ˜? of the corresponding message M? is different from A’s signature σ?, and S
can send it as part of PoF-II to R at step 4. Thus, the PoF-II set is successfully
constructed, so legitimate parties are aware of the break of the used DDSS.
Here, we introduce a definition of a signature schemes property, which allows
proving their forgery.
Definition 5 (ε-forgery detection availability) ε-forgery detection availabil-
ity (ε-FDA) for a one-time DDSS S is defined by the following experiment.
Experiment ExpFDAS,n (A)
(sk, pk)← S.Kg(1n)
(M?, σ?)← ASign(sk,·)
Let (M,σ) be the query-answer pair of Sign(sk, ·).
Return 1 iff S.Sign(sk,M?)→ σ?, S.Vf(pk, σ?,M?)→ 1, and M? 6= M .
Then the DSS scheme S has ε-FDA if there is no adversary A that succeeds with
probability ≥ ε.
Remark 1 In our consideration, we implicitly assume that the parties are able
to communicate with each other via authentic channels, e.g. when R sends a
request to S at step 3. One can see that in order to enable the detection of the
forgery event, the authenticity of the channel should be provided with some differ-
ent primitives rather than employed signatures. For example, one can use mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs), which can be based on information-theoretical
secure algorithms and symmetric keys.
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Remark 2 In the considered scheme honest users only become aware of the fact
of forgery event. However, the scheme does not allow determining who exactly in
this scenario has such powerful computational capabilities. Indeed, S is not sure
whether the signature σ? is forged by R or by A. That is why it is advisable for S
also to send an evidence E to A as well. At the same time, R is not sure, who is
the original author of σ?. It is a possible case that S has forged its own signature
(say, obtained two messages M and M? with a same signature σ = σ?), and sent
a message M to A, who then just forwarded it R. It may be in the interest for
a malicious S to reveal M? at a right moment and claim that it was a forgery.
4 ε-FDA for Lamport signatures
Here we start with a description of a generalized Lamport single bit one-time
DDSS. Consider a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, which
satisfies the random-oracle assumption [21]. It means that each new unique query
to H can be effectively considered as a sampling of a uniformly random bit string
from {0, 1}n. The (n, δ)-Lamport one-time signature ((n, δ)-L-OTS) scheme for
single bit message M ∈ {0, 1} has the following construction.
– Key pair generation algorithm ((sk, pk)← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Kg). The algorithm
generates secret and public keys in a form (sk0, sk1) and (pk0, pk1), with
ski
$← {0, 1}n+δ and pki := H(ski) (see Fig. 2). Here and after $← stands for
uniformly random sampling from a given set.
– Signature algorithm (σ ← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Sign(sk,M)). The algorithm outputs
half of the secret key as a signature: σ := skM .
– Verification algorithm (v ← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Vf(pk, σ,M))). The algorithm out-
puts v := 1, if H(s) = pkM , and its output is 0 otherwise.
sk0
H
pk0n bits
n + δ bits sk1
H
pk1
Fig. 2. Basic principle of the public key construction in the (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme.
The security of the (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme is based on the fact that in order
to forge a signature for a bit M it is required to invert the used one-way func-
tion H for a part of the public key pkM , that is traditionally assumed to be
computationally infeasible.
In our work, we particularly stress the importance of inequality between
space sizes of secret keys and public keys. Specifically, we demonstrate that for
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sufficiently large δ even if an adversary finds a correct preimage sk?M , such that
H(sk?M ) = pkM , the obtained value is different from the original skM used for
calculating pkM by the legitimate user. Then the signature of an honest user is
different from a forged signature, and so the forgery event can be revealed.
Before turning to the main theorem, we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a function f : {0, 1}n+δ → {0, 1}n with n  1 and δ ≥
0 which satisfies random-oracle assumption. Let f(x0) = y0 for some x0 ∈
{0, 1}n+δ. Define a set
Inv(y0) := {x ∈ {0, 1}n+δ|f(x) = y0} (2)
of all preimages of y0 under f . Consider a randomly taken preimage X
$←
Inv(y0). Then the probability to obtain the original preimage X = x0 has the
following lower and upper bounds:
a) Pr(X = x0) > exp(−2δ);
b) Pr(X = x0) < 5.22× 2−δ.
Proof. Let N := |Inv(y0)| be a number of preimages of y0 under f . Under the
random oracle assumption, it is given by N = 1 + N̂ , where N̂ is a random vari-
able having binomial distribution Bin(2−n, 2n+δ−1) with the success probability
2−n and number of trials equal to 2n+δ − 1. Then the corresponding probability
that a randomly chosen element X from Inv(y0) is equal to x0 is as follows:
Pr(X = x0) =
2n+δ−1∑
N=1
1
N
Pr(N = N). (3)
In order to obtain the lower bound for Pr(X = x0), we consider only the first
term in Eq. (3) and arrive at the following inequality:
Pr(X = x0) > Pr(N = 1) =
(
1− 2−n)2n+δ−1
' (1− 2−n)2n+δ ' exp(−2δ), (4)
where we use the fact that (1 − 2−n)2n ' exp(−1) for n  1. This proves part
a) of Lemma 1.
In order to obtain the upper bound for Pr(X = x0), we split the sum in
Eq. (3) into following two parts:
Pr(X = x0) =
N0∑
N=1
1
N
Pr(N = N) +
2m−1∑
N=N0+1
1
N
Pr(N = N) (5)
where N0 := k2
δ ≥ 1 for some k ∈ (0, 1). The first part can be bounded as
follows:
N0∑
N=1
1
N
Pr(N = N) ≤ Pr(N ≤ N0) ≤ (2
n+δ −N0)2−n
(2δ −N0)2 <
2−δ
(k − 1)2 , (6)
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where we use a bound for the cumulative binomial distribution function [30]. For
the second part we consider the following bound:
2m−1∑
N=N0+1
1
N
Pr(N = N) < 1
N0
2m−1∑
N=N0+1
Pr(N = N) < 1
N0
=
2−δ
k
. (7)
By combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (7) and setting k := 0.36, which corresponds to
a minimum of Pr(X = x0), we obtain Pr(X = x0) < 5.22 × 2−δ. This proves
part b) of Lemma 1. 
Remark 3 The bound for commutative binomial distribution employed in (6)
is rather rough, however, it is quite convenient for the purposes of further dis-
cussion. Tighter bound can be obtained, e.g. using the technique from Ref. [31].
The main result on the FDA property of the (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme can be
formulated as follows:
Theorem 1 (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme has ε-FDA with ε < 5.22× 2−δ.
Proof. Consider an adversary successed in forgering a signature σ? for message
M?. From the construction of the signature scheme we have H(σ?) = pkM? .
According to part b) of the Lemma 1, the probability that the obtained value
σ? coincides with the original value skM? is bounded by 5.22 × 2−δ. It follows
from the fact that skM? is generated uniformly randomly from the set {0, 1}n+δ.
Therefore, with the probability at least 1 − 5.22 × 2−δ the legitimate user’s
signature skM? ← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Sign(sk,M?) is different from the adversary’s
signature σ? and the presence of the forgery event is then proven. 
Remark 4 We note that it is extremely important to employ true randomness
in the Kg algorithm in order to provide the independence between results of the
adversary and the original value of sk. For this purpose, one can use, for example,
certified quantum random number generators.
Remark 5 We see that ε-FDA property appears only for high enough values of
δ. Meanwhile it follows from part a) of the Lemma 1 that for a common case of
δ = 0 the probability for the adversary to obtain the original value sk1 is at least
exp(−1) ≈ 0.368 that is non-negligible.
5 ε-FDA for the Winternitz Signature Scheme
Here we consider an extension of L-OTS scheme which allows signing messages
of L-bit length. We base our approach on a generalization of the Winternitz
one-time signature (W-OTS) scheme presented in Ref. [12], known as W-OTS+,
and used in XMSS [20], SPHINCS [17] and SPHINCS+ [15]. We refer our scheme
(n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+ and construct it as follows.
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Let us introduce the parameter ν ∈ {1, 2, . . .} defining blocks length in which
a message is split during a signing algorithm, where we assume that L is a
multiple of ν. Let us introduce the following auxiliary values:
w := 2ν , l1 := dL/νe, l2 := blog2(l1(w − 1))/νc+ 1, l := l1 + l2. (8)
Then we consider a family of one-way functions:
f (i)r : {0, 1}n+δ(w−i) → {0, 1}n+δ(w−i−1), (9)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , w−1} and a parameter r belongs to some domainD. We assume
that f
(i)
r satisfies the random oracle assumption for a uniformly randomly chosen
r from D. The employ of this parameter can correspond to XORing the result of
some hash function family with a random bit-mask, as it considered in Ref. [12]).
We then introduce a chain function F
(i)
r , which we define recursively in the
following way:
F (0)r (x) = x, F
(i)
r (x) = f
(i)
r (F
(i−1)
r (x)) for i ∈ {1, . . . , w − 1}. (10)
The algorithms of (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+ scheme are the following:
– Key pair generation algorithm ((sk, pk) ← (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+.Kg). First
the algorithm generates a secret key in the following form:
sk := (r, sk1, sk2, . . . , skl), with ski
$← {0, 1}n+δ(w−1) and r $← D
(see Fig. 3). Then a public key composed of the randomizing parameter r
and results of the chain function employed to ski as follows:
pk := (r, pk1, pk2, . . . , pkl) with pki := F
(w−1)
r (ski). (11)
– Signature algorithm (σ ← (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+.Sign(sk,M)). First the algo-
rithm computes base w representation of M by splitting it into ν-bit blocks
(M = (m1, . . . ,ml1), where mi ∈ {0, . . . , w− 1}). We call it a message part.
Then the algorithm computes a checksum
C :=
l1∑
i=1
(w − 1−mi) (12)
and its base w representation C = (c1, . . . , cl2). We call it a checksum part.
Define an extended string B = (b1, . . . bl) := M‖C as the concatenation of
message and checksum parts. Finally, the signature is generated as follows:
σ := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σl) with σi := F
(bi)
r (ski). (13)
– Verification algorithm (v ← (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+.Vf(pk, σ,M))). The idea of
the algorithm is to reconstruct a public key from a given signature σ and
then to check whether it coincides with original public key pk. First, the
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algorithm computes a base w string B = (B1, . . . , Bl) in the same way as in
the signature algorithm (see above). Then for each part of the signature σi
the algorithm computes the remaining part of the chain as follows:
pkchecki := f
(w−1)
r ◦ . . . ◦ f (bi+1)r (σi), (14)
where ◦ stands for the standard functions composition. If pkchecki = pki for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, then the algorithm outputs v := 1, otherwise v := 0.
f (w-1)
pk1
r
f (1)r
...
sk1 ...
f (w-1)
pkl
r
f (1)r
...
skl
n bits
n + δ bits
n + (w - 1) δ bits
n + (w - 2) δ bits
Fig. 3. Basic principle of the public key construction in the (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+
scheme.
The main result on the FDA property of the (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+ scheme can
be formulated as follows:
Theorem 2 The (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+ scheme has the -FDA property with  <
5.22× 2−δ.
Proof. Consider a scenario of successful CMA on the (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS+ scheme,
in which an adversary first forces a legitimate user with public key pk = (r, pk1, . . . , pkl)
to provide him a signature σ = (σ1, . . . , σl) for some message M , and then
generate a valid signature σ? = (σ?1 , . . . , σ
?
l ) for some message M
? 6= M . Let
(m1, . . . ,ml1) and (m
?
1, . . . ,m
?
l1
) be the w-base representations of M and M?
correspondingly. Consider extended w-base strings B = (b01, . . . , b
0
l ) and B
? =
(b?1, . . . , b
?
l ) generated by adding checksum parts. It easy to see that for any dis-
tinct M and M? there exists at least one position j ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that
b?j < bj . Indeed, even if for all positions i ∈ {1, . . . , l1} it happened that
m?i > mi, from the definition of checksum (12) it follows that there exists a
position j ∈ {l1 + 1, . . . , l2} in checksum parts such that b?j < bj .
Since σ? is a valid signature for M? we have
f (w−1)r ◦ . . . ◦ f
(b?j+1)
r (σ
?
j ) = pkj . (15)
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One can see that forgery event will be detected if the jth part of the legitimate
user’s signature of M? is different from the forged one (see also Fig. 4), so that:
σ˜?j := F
(b?j )
r (skj) 6= σ?j . (16)
...
skj
σj*
...
σj
pkj
...
n bits
n + (w - 1) δ bits
n + (w - bj - 1) δ bits*
n + (w - bj - 1) δ bits
Fig. 4. Illustration of the principle of PoF-II construction for the (n, δ, L, ν)-W-
OTS+ scheme.
Consider two possible cases. The first is that the condition (15) is fulfilled,
but the following relation holds true:
f
(bj)
r ◦ . . . ◦ f (b
?
j+1)
r (σ
?
j ) 6= σj . (17)
In this case we obtain σ˜?j 6= σ?j with unit probability since
σj = f
(bj)
r ◦ . . . ◦ f (b
?
j+1)
r (σ˜
?
j ) 6= f (bj)r ◦ . . . ◦ f
(b?j+1)
r (σ
?
j ). (18)
In the second case we have the following identity:
f
(bj)
r ◦ . . . ◦ f (b
?
j+1)
r (σ
?
j ) = σj , (19)
which automatically implies the fulfilment of Eq. (15). Consider a function
F := f
(bj)
r ◦ . . . ◦ f (b
?
j+1)
r : {0, 1}n∗+δ ∆ → {0, 1}n∗ , (20)
where ∆ := b0j − b?j ≥ 1 and n∗ := n + δ(w − b?j − 1). This function satisfies
random oracle assumptions, since each of {f (k)r }bjk=b?j do. According to part b) of
Lemma 1, we have the probability of the adversary to obtain σ?j = σ˜
?
j is bounded
by  < 5.22× 2−δ ∆ ≤ 5.22× 2−δ. 
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Remark 6 One can see that the excess of the preimage space size over the image
space size, given by δ, is a crucial condition for the FDA property both for L-OTS
and W-OTS+ schemes. We also note that in the case of the W-OTS+ scheme
it is important to have such excess for all the elements of the employed one-way
chain.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have considered the ε-FDA property of DDSS that allows de-
tecting a forgery event generated be advanced mathematical algorithms and/or
unexpectedly powerful computational resources. We have shown that this prop-
erty is fulfilled for properly-designed hash-based signatures, in particular, for L-
OTS and W-OTS+ schemes with properly tuned parameters. As we have noted,
the probability of the successful demonstration of the DDSS forgery event de-
pends on an excess of preimage space sizes over image space sizes and using true
randomness in the generation of secret keys in hash-based DDSS. The important
next step is to study this property for other types of hash-based signatures.
Our observation is important in the view of the crypto-agility paradigm.
Indeed, the considered forgery detection serves as an alarm that the employed
cryptographic hash function has a critical vulnerability and it has to be replaced.
The similar concept has been recently considered for detecting brute-force at-
tacks on cryptocurrency wallets in the Bitcoin network [32,33].
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